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Inequality and markets: a response to  Jessica Flanigan 
 
Anne Phillips 
 
In refusing  stark distinctions between markets in bodily services or parts and other kinds of 
market, Jessica Flanigan echoes many of the points I make in ‘It’s my Body and I‘ll Do What I 
Like With It’. Like her, I see the market in bodily services as one of many markets that rely 
on inequality. Like her, I recognise that some of those choosing to become surrogate 
mothers gain satisfaction from their role; like her, I doubt that many sex workers actively 
enjoy their trade, but note that this choice too may not be driven by economic necessity 
alone. I agree that the criminalisation of sex work is not a desirable policy option. I certainly 
do not consider markets in bodily services or parts as unique in involving the body: indeed a 
significant part of my argument is devoted to showing that we take our bodies with us in all 
the work we do. As I stress throughout, ‘the body’ does not provide us with a neat 
demarcation line telling us which things or activities are legitimately up for sale. Since all 
activities, including the most seemingly cerebral, involve bodies, some of what is 
problematic about markets in bodily services or parts will be present in other markets too.  
I argue in the essay that commercial surrogacy and sex work occupy the outer edges of a 
continuum that is, in some way, a feature of all labour markets. All paid employment 
subjects the body to external regulation and control, and while the regulation is more 
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extensive and intrusive in activities to which the body is central (sex work and surrogacy, for 
example, but also professional football and ballet dancing), the vulnerability associated with 
a temporary loss of authority over our selves remains – and should, in my view, be 
acknowledged – even in activities to which the body is more incidental. That Flanigan misses 
– or at least, under-emphasises -  this part of my argument reflects, I think, her greater 
confidence in ‘normal’ labour contracts. If we see nothing particularly troubling in the power 
relations of everyday employment, and can identify plenty of parallels between everyday 
employment and sex work or commercial surrogacy, then we will see no special reason to 
be troubled by markets in bodily services. But if you think, as I do, that there is something 
troubling in the power relations of everyday employment, the parallels tell a different story. 
In recognising that many of the differences are differences of degree, we become more 
aware that anyone agreeing to work for another – in whatever sphere of employment - 
makes herself vulnerable to a loss of personal autonomy. This is not (as I say in the essay) 
something we can readily avoid, for most of us have to work for others at some point in our 
lives. Knowing a vulnerability is still better than not realising it exists.  
Flanigan does not sufficiently recognise the extent to which my arguments rest on features 
common to all labour markets, but she is right, of course, that I am arguing more than this. 
What she focuses on is my claim that ‘more so, and more intrinsically than other markets, 
markets in body parts or bodily services depend on inequality’. Against this, she argues, first,  
that the variety of tastes and talents can explain specialisation in the provision of bodily 
services just as well as it explains specialisation in other jobs; secondly, that I overlook a 
further important dimension of inequality, the inequality between  the fertile and infertile, 
the organ-rich and those facing the terror of organ failure. 
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On the first point, I am struck by the way money functions in Flanigan’s analysis of tastes.  
She notes that people have different ‘tastes’ regarding their organs  - that some won’t 
permit them to be re-used even after death, for example, while others donate their organs 
to strangers – but she sensibly avoids more dramatic claims about some people ‘liking’ to 
manage with one kidney and others ‘preferring ‘ two. She does not claim that prostitutes 
have a real taste for their sex work, making only the less contentious point that many have 
chosen this over worse paid forms of employment. She does say that many women enjoy 
being pregnant, even without the prospect of raising the child, but does not present this 
‘taste’ for pregnancy as the main reason why women choose to become surrogate mothers. 
(This is just as well, for as the global trade in surrogacy develops increasingly industrial 
conditions, most notably in India’s surrogacy hostels, that claim would be hard to sustain.)  
In all three cases, the ‘taste’ she falls back on is the taste for money. The reason I might 
choose to specialise in the provision of bodily services or the sale of my body parts, while 
others pursue different specialisations, is not because of what we normally understand by 
the diversity of tastes and talents. It is because I have a particular taste for money.   
My claim (in retrospect, rather a minimal one) was that in an imagined world of social, 
economic, and gender equality, it would be hard to conceive of anyone choosing to 
specialise in kidney vending. Flanigan’s claim is that, even in that world, there would be 
some whose special taste for money  - for money over and above what those equal others 
think they need - is such that selling a kidney becomes a desirable choice. Yet  in that 
imagined universe, what can that ‘taste’ for money represent other than a taste for 
inequality? 
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My own intuition is that in a world of social, economic, and gender equality, we would not 
find many characters with this particular attachment, but even if we allow for the odd 
individual with this taste, I cannot see his or her putative existence as justifying the 
introduction of legal markets in organs. The right to choose cannot be the only 
consideration here, if only because one person’s right to sell can reduce the range of choices 
available to others. Where kidney markets have been normalised, for example, there is 
evidence that debt collectors put pressure on borrowers to sell a kidney in order to repay a 
debt. The opportunity for some to sell then reduces the opportunity for others to refuse to 
do; more precisely, it still leaves them that opportunity, but reduces their opportunities to 
borrow. i The introduction of a market does not just expand the range of choices; it can also 
constrain them.  
Markets change things, and one of the things they can change is the relations in which we 
stand to one another. The inequality associated with body trades has, in my argument, two 
features. There is the material inequality that enables some to be buyers whilst propelling 
others into selling. There is also the inequality in relations of esteem that is so often 
associated with this. This is the point of the contrast I try to draw between the ways we 
might relate to the other in a context of donation (a stranger donating blood marrow or a 
kidney, but also a relative offering to bear a child for us, or a friend offering to help us out 
with some sexual malfunction), and the ways we might relate to the other in the context of 
a sale. Donation, I suggest, encourages us to think more explicitly about our moral equality: 
to think about whether we would have been equally willing to provide the kidney, the 
pregnancy, or the sex therapy, had we been in a position to offer this: to hope that, had 
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things been different, we would have equally generous. A market in any of these things 
relieves the purchasers of the obligation to think themselves into the sellers’ shoes.  
This is widely thought of as one of the virtues of markets, and in many ways it is. We do not 
need to ask whether the baker is male or female, black or white, goes to church or mosque, 
we just judge by the quality of the bread. We do not have to wish ourselves into the baker’s 
shoes in order to appreciate the skill of the baking. My claim is that the trade in body parts 
and services differs from this, for while we do not all have either the skill or inclination to 
become bakers, we all have, and all want to have, a body. When some of us nonetheless 
become positioned as buyers and others as sellers, we can be pretty sure that material 
inequality – not  a diversity in tastes and talents - plays the central role in determining this 
division. The related point is that body markets do not generate the kind of mutual respect 
for one another’s skills that can accompany other aspects of the division of labour. Precisely 
because it is so difficult to attribute this particular division of labour to a diversity of tastes 
and talents, those selling the part or service tend to be treated as lesser beings. We have 
ample evidence of this already from studies of legal and illegal trades in body parts, some 
considerable supporting evidence from studies of the sex trade, and more ambiguous 
evidence from studies of surrogacy. As I acknowledge in the essay, this aspect of my 
argument works best for body parts, somewhat less well for sex work, and less well again 
for commercial surrogacy. Here, again, there is a continuum, but the existence of a 
continuum should not absolve us from concern. 
The second central point of Flanigan’s argument is that fertility services and organ sales (she 
is less convinced of the necessity for prostitution) are ‘jobs that need to be done’, and need 
to be done, moreover, because otherwise there is an unacceptable inequality between the 
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fertile and infertile, between the organ rich and organ poor. ‘This troubling inequality can 
only be addressed by expanding access to lifesaving organs and fertility services.’ ‘Without 
organ transplants, thousands of people… die, so this job is necessary.’  
I find this a weak argument, for a number of reasons. First, the fact that people die without 
x does not mean x is necessary: people may die if we do not torture the terrorist for 
information, but that does not make torture a necessity. Second, normative arguments from 
inequality need to be addressed at a global, not just local, level, and once we add in the 
problems of illness and infertility in the global south, it becomes apparent that there cannot 
be enough surrogates and organ sellers to go around.  Proposing the market as the global 
solution to inequality between the fertile and  infertile, the organ rich and organ poor, 
makes little sense; market solutions are only half plausible if we imagine an equal 
distribution of income and/or ignore significant parts of the world. Finally, and more 
empirically, there are alternative ways of expanding access to life-saving organs other than 
legalising markets. Countries with highly developed hospital systems for counselling 
bereaved relatives  (Spain, for example) have significantly  raised the incidence of organ 
donation from the deceased; the numbers volunteering for live organ donation, including to 
strangers, continues to rise; and if recent medical developments continue, it may soon be 
possible to use synthetic organs, combined with the patient's own stem cells. This has the 
additional advantage of reducing the risk of rejection and eliminating the need for 
immunosuppressive drugs.ii   
My solution to the problems posed by body markets is not to ‘force everyone into 
unpleasant work, limit compensation for those who do unpleasant work, or eliminate 
unpleasant professions’, though I do suggest, in passing, that if some tasks are so 
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unpleasant that no one would willingly choose them, societies would be well advised to find 
ways of either eliminating these or sharing them out. However, the most pressing problems 
we face as regards markets in bodily services and parts are not really about unpleasant but 
necessary social tasks. The shortages that Flanigan stresses are in many ways recent 
creations, shortages made possible by developments in reproductive and transplant 
technology that have opened up life- saving and life-enhancing prospects for some  but at 
the cost of what is potentially life-risking and life-reducing for others. Further advances in 
medical technology may solve what will then turn out to be only a temporary, transitional, 
shortage. But we can be pretty sure that other advances will pose equally troubling 
dilemmas, opening up yet further prospects for the bodies of some to be employed to sort 
out problems with the bodies of others. As we move forward on this new terrain, it is worth 
pausing to think, first about whether we wish to regard our bodies as property, and 
secondly, about whether sending the body to market is compatible with equality. 
 
                                                          
i I take this example, from Debra Satz Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale Oxford 
University Press, 2010: 200-201 
ii http://news.discovery.com/human/first-artificial-organ-transplant-110708.html 
